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I. INTRODUCTION
N WATSON v. Philip Morris,' the United States Supreme Court
decided whether the Philip Morris Companies, when they
marketed Marlboro Lights, qualified as a "person acting under a
federal officer" within the meaning of the Federal Officer Re-
moval Statute (FORS).2 The thesis of this article is that if any of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) designees had been
involved in a similar issue, framed within an aviation context,
FORS could properly be used to remove the case to federal
court.
Aviation manufacturers are confronted with a fifty-state patch-
work quilt of tort laws and procedural rules when litigation in-
volves their products. The national and international scope of
the aviation industry, the extreme mobility of their products,
and jurisdictional rules generally subject aviation manufacturers
to being haled into the local courts of any of the fifty states to
answer lawsuits, regardless of whether the manufacturer has a
physical presence in a given state. The alternative to being a
stranger in a state court forum is to seek transfer to the presum-
ably more neutral playing field of the United States District
Court. However, the means of moving claims litigation from
state court to federal court are limited, and complaints are often
1 127 S. Ct. 2301 (2007).
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442 (West 2006). Ironically, at the same time Philip Morris
urged that it acted as a federal agent for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
the United States had convinced the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia that Philip Morris had engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud in
its marketing of "light" cigarettes in violation of federal racketeering laws. See
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2006), stay
denied 449 F. Supp. 2d 988 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2006); order clarified by 477 F. Supp.
2d 191 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2007).
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crafted to thwart any opportunity to remove the case to federal
court. This article will discuss the application of FORS, one of
the lesser-used and often overlooked statutory vehicles which
may enable an aviation manufacturer to remove a complaint
filed in state court to federal court.
Federal court jurisdiction over civil litigation is carefully pre-
served under the federal rules to limit the federal court case
load and to preserve constitutional protection of the rights and
powers of the individual states.3 Federal jurisdiction over non-
criminal matters has traditionally been limited to statutorily or
constitutionally reserved jurisdiction (original federal question
jurisdiction)4 and protection of a foreign state's resident from
potential favoritism in another state's court (diversity jurisdic-
tion).' In an era when individuals and companies have an in-
creased national presence, it is not surprising that aviation
manufacturers perceive a benefit to having their disputes de-
cided under the uniform federal rules and avoiding even the
suggestion of local favoritism present in the state court system. 6
Individuals or companies operating on a national scale may
also seek jurisdiction in federal courts to assure the uniform and
informed application of federal doctrines that do not grant fed-
eral jurisdiction. In the milieu of aviation law, the government
3 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976). In 2005, the Supreme Court
explained that "the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if
federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment about the sound
division of labor between state and federal courts." Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,
Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005).
4 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2006).
5 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2006).
6 See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6-14 (5th ed. 2003); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84JUDICATURE 128, 134
(2000) (arguing that defendants win appeals in federal circuit courts more fre-
quently then plaintiffs win appeals in federal circuit courts); Kevin M. Clermont
& Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About The Legal
System? Win Rates and Removal jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 581-82
(1998). For a discussion of a congressional proposal to remove more cases from
state courts to federal court-one of the most contentious aspects of civil litiga-
tion-see 2006 Federal Courts Jurisdiction Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 5540
Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5-88 (2005) (statements of Janet C. Hall, U.S. District
CourtJudge for the District of Connecticut; Artur D. Hellman, Professor, Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh School of Law; Richard A. Samp, Chief Counsel, Washington
Legal Foundation), available at www.commdocs.house.gov/committees/judici-
ary/hju24607.000/hju24607_0.HTM.
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contractor's defense 7 and the doctrine of implied preemption'
serve as examples where the doctrine is based in federal law, but
because the doctrine is not infused with federal question juris-
diction, it may be interpreted and applied by state courts as well
as federal courts. Federal courts may be more inclined to fully
apply doctrines that are federal in origin.
The aviation industry is one of only a few industries where
federal governmental regulation is pervasive, detailed, and virtu-
ally exclusive.9 The FAA Designee Program, whereby the FAA
designates individuals and companies in the industry to act on
behalf of the FAA, involves thousands of individuals in the pri-
vate sector authorized by the FAA to perform examination, test-
ing, and inspection functions for the FAA."0 Congress has
recognized that the FAA is a "unique agency being one of the
few non-defense government agencies that operates 24 hours a
day, 365 days of the year,... to carry out its responsibilities for a
state-of-the-art industry."" The GAO has found that designees
"perform more than 90 percent of FAA's certification activities,
thus greatly leveraging the agency's resources."'12 Indeed, it is
difficult to find another federal agency that is authorized by
Congress to delegate so much of its statutory powers to the pri-
vate sector.
This article will provide an in-depth examination of the his-
tory and application of FORS, as well as the mechanics of its
application, set in the context of the FAA Designee Program,
and the role of manufacturers and individuals serving as FAA
designees.
7 See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1988) and its
progeny.
8 See infra section II.C.3.a.
9 In 1973, during a congressional hearing, former Texas Congressman Jack
Brooks questioned the ability of the industry to work for the FAA: "Such a proce-
dure [the FAA designee system] is most unique and requires exceptionally criti-
cal oversight." See Fed. Aviation Admin., Designation and Designee Background,
http://www.faa.gov/about/history/deldes-background (last visited Oct. 15,
2007).
10 Prof'l Airways Sys. Specialists, AFL-CIO, FAA Must Ensure Better Oversight
of Changing Designee Programs, http://www.passnational.org/Public/issues_8.
html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
'1 Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 221 Stat. 3227 (1996).
12 See UNITED STATES GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-40, AVIATION
SAFETY: FAA NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS DESIGNEE PROGRAMS
12 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0540.pdf.
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II. REMOVAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1442, THE "FEDERAL
OFFICER" REMOVAL STATUTE
FORS has long been held to be ajurisdictional grant in and of
itself.13 As the Supreme Court explained in Mesa v. California,14
it is "a pure jurisdictional statute, seeking to do nothing more
than grant district court jurisdiction over cases in which a fed-
eral officer is a defendant" and "cannot independently support
Article III 'arising under' jurisdiction. 15 Rather, "it is the rais-
ing of a federal question in the officer's removal petition that
constitutes the federal law under which the action against the
federal officer [or agent] 'arises' for Article III purposes."16
Removal under § 1442 removes the entire case to the federal
court, even if there are other defendants who could not have
removed the action.17 Furthermore, dismissal of the federal of-
ficer from a removed case does not divest the district court of
jurisdiction unless no personal jurisdiction existed over the
officer. 1 8
The FORS allows the United States, federal agencies and of-
ficers, and persons who act under such officers, to remove oth-
erwise non-federal cases based on assertion of a "colorable"
federal defense, stating in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a state
court against any of the following may be removed by them to
the district court of the United States for the District and Divi-
sion embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or
any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of
any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity
for any act under color of such office."9
13 Smith v. Puett, 506 F. Supp. 134, 137 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Perez v. Rhid-
dlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65, 71 (E.D. La. 1975); Horne v. Alderhold, 1 F. Supp.
690, 691 (N.D. Ga. 1932).
14 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
15 Id. at 136.
16 Id.
17 Dillon v. Miss. Military Dep't., 23 F.3d 915, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1994).
18 IMFC Prof'l Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d
152, 159 (5th Cir. 1982).
19 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a) (West 2006).
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A. HISTORY
The nearly 200 year history of FORS was discussed at length
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Willingham v. Morgan.20 The first
provision was derived from an 1815 customs statute to enforce a
trade embargo with England despite opposition from the New
England States, who did not support the War of 1812.21 Federal
officials involved in enforcing the customs statute were allowed
to remove any suit to the federal court if it arose because of any
act done "under color" of the statute.22 The original removal
provision was supposed to protect federal officers from hostile
state courts. 2' The so-called Force Bill, passed in 1833 due to
South Carolina's threats of nullification,24 allowed removal of all
suits for acts done under the customs laws.25 The Civil War
brought on a new group of removal statutes that were eventually
codified into a permanent statute. The statute applied primarily
to cases arising out of enforcement of the revenue laws. 26 Fi-
nally, Congress passed the current provision as part of the Judi-
cial Code of 1948, extending the statute to cover all federal
officers.2 7
The main purpose of § 1442 is to provide a federal forum
when a federal official has a defense because of his official du-
ties, so as to allow a trial without threat of local interests or
prejudice. 2 Another purpose is to allow the validity of the of-
ficer's federal defense to be adjudicated in a federal forum.29
Congress intended § 1442 to curb the ability of state courts to
subject federal officials to their state subpoena powers3 ° and to
prevent state courts from interfering with the exercise of federal
law.3 1 This intention arose from a concern that state govern-
20 395 U.S. 402 (1969).
21 Id. at 405.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. The Force Bill "sought to protect federal officers engaged in enforcing
the revenue laws of the United States from attempts (primarily South Carolina)
to nullify the national laws by local statutes." 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACtiCE AND PROCEDURE § 3727 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2007).
25 Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405.
26 Id. at 405-06.
27 Id. at 406.
28 Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1981).
29 Id.; see also Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407.
30 Nationwide Investors v. Miller, 793 F.2d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1986).
31 Williams v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (citing
Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 126 (1989)).
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ments, hostile to duly enacted federal laws, could frustrate im-
plementation of federal law by allowing civil or criminal cases to
be brought in state court.32
B. LIBERAL APPLICATION
Unlike other removal statutes, courts liberally construe FORS
because its purpose is to guarantee that the federal courts deter-
mine the validity of federal defenses available to federal officers
or those acting under them.33 Indeed, the United States Su-
preme Court requires district courts to credit the removing de-
fendant's theory of the case, merely requiring that the asserted
federal defense be plausible. 4
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that one of the
most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the
defendant's federal defense tried in federal court. 5 To advance
this policy, the Supreme Court has rejected a "narrow, grudging
interpretation" of the statute3 6 in analyzing both the "color of
office" and the "colorable federal defense" requirements.3 7 Sig-
nificantly, in Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,38 the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the liberal interpretation of the removal statute
extends to the timeliness of removal.3 9 The court said:
But where the timeliness of a federal officer's removal is at issue,
we extend section 1442's liberal interpretation to section 1446
.... Our interpretation of section 1446(b) protects the govern-
ment's right of removal and encourages plaintiffs to disclose the
facts underlying their claims early on. We note that an opposite
32 Ruffin v. Armco Steel Corp., 959 F. Supp. 770, 772 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (quot-
ing Brown &. Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 913 F. Supp. 530, 533 (W.D.
Ky. 1996)).
33 Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406 ("The federal officer removal statute is not 'nar-
row' or 'limited."'); Nationwide Investors, 793 F.2d at 1046 ("The Supreme Court
has explicitly endorsed a broad reading of § 1442 rather than a 'narrow, grudg-
ing interpretation."' (citing Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407)).
34 United States v. Todd, 245 F.3d 691, 693 (8th Cir. 2001) ("For a defense to
be considered colorable, it need only be plausible; § 1442(a) (1) does not require
a court to hold that a defense will be successful before removal is appropriate."
(citing Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406-07)).
35 Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999) (citing Willingham, 395
U.S. at 407).
36 Id.
37 See id. at 431-32.
38 445 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2006).
39 Id. at 1253; see also Don Zupanec, Federal Officer Removal-Timeliness, FED. LITI-
GATOR, June 2006, at 5.
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result would encourage gamesmanship and defeat the policies
underlying sections 1442 and 1446.40
The removing defendant is not required to virtually win the
suit before he is entitled to removal.41 Section 1442 does not
require an intense inquiry into the merits of the official's as-
serted federal defense.4 2 Rather, "for removal to be proper
under § 1442," the federal defense alleged "need only be plausi-
ble; its ultimate validity is not to be determined at the time of
removal." 4
The Supreme Court also construes the "acting under" re-
quirement and its causal connection component liberally, and
in doing so, the Court has instructed district courts to "credit
the [removing defendant's] theory of the case for purposes of
both elements of [the] jurisdictional inquiry. ' 44 This liberal in-
terpretation is required because "U] ust as requiring a 'clearly
sustainable defense' rather than a colorable defense would de-
feat the purpose of the removal statute,45 so would demanding
an airtight case on the merits in order to show the required
causal connection.
46
40 Durham, 445 F.3d at 1253; but see Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 478 F.3d
965, 968 n.5 (8th Cir. 2007) (declining "invitation" to extend the federal officer
removal statute's "liberal interpretation" to the time limits in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446
(West 2006)).
41 Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 431 (citing Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402,
407 (1969)).
42 Jefferson County v. Acker, 137 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1998), rev'd on
other grounds, 527 U.S. 423 (1999). The Supreme Court upheld the portion of the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Jefferson County concerning the proper construction
and application of the federal officer removal statute. Compare Jefferson County,
527 U.S. at 430-33, with Jefferson County, 137 F.3d at 1316-18.
4 Jefferson County, 137 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Mo-
tors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1427 (11th Cir. 1996)); accord Winters v. Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 400 (5th Cir. 1998) ("It is important to note that the
defendants need not prove the asserted defense, but need only articulate its 'col-
orable' applicability to the plaintiffs claims."), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1999);
Williams v. Brantley, 492 F. Supp. 925, 927-28 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[U]nless the
substantive defense raised by the federal officer is completely frivolous, he is enti-
tled to have the merits of such defense decided in a federal court."), afJ'd, 738
F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
- Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 432.
45 Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407.
46Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 432. Accord Winters, 149 F.3d at 398 ("[T]he stat-
ute's 'color of federal office' requirement is neither 'limited' nor 'narrow,' but
should be afforded a broad reading so as not to frustrate the statute's underlying
rationale.").
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The "color of office" requirement of § 1442 has also been
broadly construed.47 Courts have held that there need only be a
casual connection with official duties that can reasonably be in-
terpreted as an official rather than a purely personal act.41
Further, the identification of the specific federal officer under
which the person serves is not necessary. For instance, it is suffi-
cient to allege that the designee is selected and serves under the
FAA Administrator. 49 Finally, some courts have held that the
broad interpretation of § 1442 mandates that any factual dis-
putes be resolved in favor of federal jurisdiction.50
1. The "Well-Pleaded Complaint" Rule Does Not Apply.
A defendant who meets the removal requirements under
§ 1442 may remove the suit to a federal court even when the
plaintiffs pleadings do not raise a federal question.51 It is irrele-
vant whether the plaintiff could have initially sued the defen-
dant in federal court under the asserted cause of action.52
FORS is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule,
which states that an action may be removed from state court to
federal court only if a federal district court would have had orig-
inal jurisdiction. 53 FORS vests federal courts with independent
47 Abrams v. Playle, 414 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D. Guam 1976); Areskog v. United
States, 396 F. Supp. 834, 838 (D. Conn. 1975) ("In construing the 'color of office'
requirement for removal under § 1442 (a) (1), the Willingham court emphasized
that the phrase must be broadly construed in order to effectuate the purpose
behind the federal officer removal statute." (citing Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407)).
48 Preston v. Edmundson, 263 F. Supp. 370, 373 (N.D. Okla. 1967); Perez v.
Rhiddlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D.C. La. 1965); Logemann v. Stock, 81 F.
Supp. 337, 339 (D. Neb. 1949).
49 Magnin v. Teldyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1429 n.1 (lth Cir. 1996)
("Private persons selected to act as designees are Representatives of the Adminis-
trator .... ") (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 16,176, 16,176 (1983)); see also AIG Europe
(UK) Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. CV 02-8703-GAF, 2003 WL 257702,
at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2003) (delegation to aircraft manufacturer under 49
U.S.C. § 44702(d)), cited with approval and distinguished on the facts in Kaye v. Sw.
Airlines Co., No. Civ. A. 3:05CV0450-D, 2005 WL 2074327, at *3 n.6 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 29, 2005); but see Britton v. Rolls Royce Engine Servs., No. C 05-01057 SI,
2005 WL 1562855, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2005).
50 Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226, 231-33 (5th Cir. 1992); Preston v. Tenet
Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (E.D. La. 2006),
affd Nos. 07-30132, 07-30160, 2007 WL 1217923 (5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2007).
51 Alsup v. 3-Day Blinds, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 838, 844 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (quoting
Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)).
52 Special Prosecutor of N.Y. v. U.S. Attorney for S.D.N.Y., 375 F. Supp. 797,
801 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
53 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).
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jurisdiction over cases involving federal officers, or persons act-
ing under them, despite the non-federal cast of the complaint
because "the federal-question element is met if the defense de-
pends on federal law."54 The lack of any mention of federal law
in the complaint is not controlling, and " [t]hus, further inquiry
must be made as to whether the action is one governed by fed-
eral law," regardless of artful pleading.55
2. An "Absolute" Removal Right
Removal under § 1442 by a federal officer, or someone acting
under a federal officer, for an act under color of office is an
absolute right; the court does not have discretion.56 Removal is
permitted even where the federal official's conduct is found to
be misconduct, provided that the misconduct was committed
under "color of office. '57 In addition, subject matter jurisdic-
tion is granted to the district court under § 1442.5" Claims that
would not be independently removable may be heard by the fed-
eral court even if the basis for removal jurisdiction is dropped
from the proceedings.59
C. ELEMENTS
The statute's independent right of removal has three princi-
pal elements. First, the defendant must be a federal officer, a
federal agency, or a person acting under a federal officer for
purposes of the statute.60 Second, the suit must be for an act
done while acting under "color of such office," which also al-
leges some causal connection between the defendant's actions
under the federal officer or agency direction and the plaintiffs
54 Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1991); see also Ely Valley Mines
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 644 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating
that the federal officer removal statute "provides a right of removal independent
of [28] U.S.C. § 1441 and . . . is not keyed to the original jurisdiction of the
federal district court").
55 Bruan, Gordon & Co. v. Hellmers, 502 F. Supp. 897, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
56 Malone v. Longo, 463 F. Supp. 139, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing Willingham
v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969)); see also United States v. Penney, 320 F.
Supp. 1396, 1397 (D.D.C. 1970).
57 Logemann v. Stock, 81 F. Supp. 337, 339 (D. Neb. 1949).
58 Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir.
1985) (citing Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406).
59 Watkins v. Grover, 508 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1974); see also IMFC Prof'l
Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 159 (5th Cir.
1982).
60 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1) (West 2006).
494
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claim."' Third, the defendant must assert a colorable federal
defense.62
1. 'Federal Officer" and "Person"
The Dictionary Act 63 defines "officer" to include "any person
authorized by law to perform the duties of the office," and "per-
son" to include "corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as in-
dividuals," unless the context indicates otherwise.6 4 An officer is
distinguished from other full-time employees of the federal gov-
ernment by the extent of authority he or she may properly exer-
cise.65 Courts have also found that a corporation is a "person"
entitled to the benefit of removal under § 1442(a)(1).66 In
cases where a corporation is engaged in activities that may im-
plement a federal policy or directive, courts have indicated that
"person" should be construed broadly to include corporations
that have acted under federal direction or authority.67 Thus,
corporate manufacturers can satisfy the first removal
requirement.
It follows that delegations to private "persons" do not make
them "officers" unless the federal statute creates such tenure,
61 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1989).
62 Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999); Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133;
Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 397-400 (5th Cir.
1998); Magnin v. Teldyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1427-28 (11th Cir. 1996).
63 1 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2005).
64 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United
States, 529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("[W]hen Congress uses
that word [person] in federal statutes enforceable by the Federal Government or
by a federal agency, it applies to States and state agencies as well as to private
individuals and corporations."); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393
(1868).
65 Freytag v. Comm'r Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
66 Winters, 149 F.3d at 398; Akin v. Big Three Indus., 851 F. Supp. 819, 822-23
(E.D. Tex. 1994); Pack v. AC & S, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1099, 1102-03 (D. Md.
1993); Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Bahrs v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 795 F. Supp. 965, 968-69 (D. Ariz. 1992); Ryan v. Dow
Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 934, 946-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
67 See Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 946-950 (analyzing the use of "person" in
§ 1442(a)(1)). While the majority of cases and statutes interpreting the term
"person" have interpreted the term to include corporations, there are exceptions
where the term "person" as used in § 1442 is interpreted to include only natural
persons. See C.H. v. Am. Red Cross, 684 F. Supp. 1018, 1023-24 (E.D. Mo. 1987);
Gensplit Fin. Corp. v. Foreign Credit Ins. Assoc., 616 F. Supp. 1504, 1508-10
(E.D. Wis. 1985).
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duration, emoluments and duties as would be associated with a
public office. As such, the individual or corporation is not the
occupant of a constitutional office, but is, rather, a private party
who has been delegated some federal responsibilities.
2. "Acting Under" a Federal Officer.68
Some courts have said that removal by a private defendant
"acting under" a federal officer must be based on a finding that
the acts establishing the core of the plaintiff's state-law claim
were performed pursuant to a federal officer's "direct orders or
under comprehensive and detailed regulations."69 It is not
enough to prove that the relevant acts occurred under the gen-
eral auspices of a federal officer or that the corporation partici-
pates in a federally regulated industry."v Others have said that
the federal officer is required to have "direct control" over the
defendant seeking removal, and that this "is established by show-
ing strong government intervention and the possibility that the
defendant will be sued in state court as a result of federal
control."7"
It has been argued that the only "acting under" test appropri-
ate for application under the FORS is not based upon detailed
or specific federal regulation or supervision, but is found in the
test presented by the United States Solicitor General and under
the caselaw he cites in the amicus curiae brief that was before the
Supreme Court in Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.72 The
Solicitor General states (1) that the "text, evolution and judicial
construction of the [FORS] make clear that it permits removal
by private parties only when they act on behalf of or otherwise
assist federal officers in carrying out their official duties;" (2)
that "limiting private-party removal to persons assisting federal
officers in the performance of official duties accords with the
purpose of the [FORS];" and (3) that "permitting removal by
private parties subjected to detailed and specific federal regula-
68 See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Who Is "Person Acting Under" Officer
of United States or Any Agency Thereoffor Purposes of Availability of Right to Remove State
Action to Federal Court Under 28 US.C.A. § 1442(a)(1), 166 A.L.R. FED. 297, 297
(2007).
69 Id.
70 Freiberg v. Swinerton & Walberg Prop. Serv., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1144,
1152 (D. Colo. 2002) (citing Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 947).
71 Pack, 838 F. Supp. at 1103; accord Fung, 816 F. Supp. at 572-73.
72 See infra, text accompanying notes 226-42.
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tion would potentially shift into federal court a wide range of
traditional state law claims. 73
The Solicitor General's position is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's holding that "it is sufficient for one seeking re-
moval under § 1442(a) (1) to show that his relationship to the
parties is derived solely from his official duties. ' 74 The FAA Des-
ignee Program fits this test well. As one district court has ob-
served, the statute authorizes the FAA Administrator to delegate
the issuance of certificates to a qualified person, or a qualified
employee under that person's supervision, and the Administra-
tor accordingly designated the defendants in that case to serve
as FAA representatives by issuing certificates according to the
FAA Administrator's specifications. 75 Consequently, when a pri-
vate party assists a federal officer in performing federal duties, as
an FAA designee clearly does by statutory delegation, the "acting
under" test is satisfied.76
73 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *11,
*17, *19, Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., No. 05-1284, 2007 WL 621847 (Feb.
26, 2007).
74 Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406-07 (1969); Hazen v. S. Hills Nat'l
Bank of Tulsa, 414 F.2d 778, 779 (10th Cir. 1969).
75 Kaye v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. Civ. A. 3:05CV0450-D, 2005 WL 2074327, at *3
n.6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2005) (citing AIG Europe (UK) Ltd. v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., No. CV 02-8703-GAF, 2003 WL 257702, at *2 (C.D. Cal.Jan. 28, 2003));
see also McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196-97
(M.D. Fla. 2006); Teague v. Bell Helicopter Servs., Inc., No. 4:03-CV-004-A, 2003
WL 21135481, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2003).
76 By comparison, note that the "acting under" test under FORS and the "act-
ing for" test under the Federal Tort Claims Act (extending immunity to the pri-
vate actor), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b) and 2671, are similar, but
fundamentally different. In the case of the latter, "employee of the government"
is statutorily defined to include "persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in
an official capacity." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (West 2006) (emphasis added). "Official
capacity" is, in turn, construed by caselaw as connoting federal officer status. See,
e.g., Leone v. United States, 910 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied 499 U.S.
905 (1991); Charlima, Inc. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1989);
Gary W. Allen, The FAA's Designee Program: A System Under Pressure, AIR & SPACE L.,
Fall 1991, at 4-5; AndrewJ. Dilk, Negligence of Federal Aviation Administration Dele-
gates Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42J. AIR L. & COM. 575, 597-601 (1976).
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found the
United States immune from liability because the designees were performing a
discretionary function, an exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act; thus, there
was no need to determine whether these DAR's otherwise implicated the United
States for liability purposes. Berman v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 1486, 1492-94
(N.D. Ga. 1983).
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The defendant must further establish that the suit is "for an
act under color of such office."7 7 In order to satisfy this require-
ment, the defendant must "show a nexus, a 'causal connection'
between the charged conduct and asserted official authority.9
7 8
In the context of an aviation case, a defendant must also show
that there is a "causal connection" linking the exercise of FAA
authority to the acts challenged in the plaintiff's complaint and
that, therefore, the plaintiffs damages and claims of the defen-
dant's alleged wrongdoing in performing functions of the FAA
as a designee are indeed connected.
3. There Must Be a "Colorable" Federal Defense
The defendant must also assert a "colorable federal de-
fense. '79 The federal defense asserted by the federal officer (or
a person acting under a federal officer) need only be plausible;
its ultimate merit is not to be determined at the time of re-
moval.8 o The officer need not conclusively succeed on the mer-
its of his defense prior to removal8" Also, a defense is
considered "federal" if it would not exist in the absence of fed-
eral law.8 2
The Supreme Court has reasoned that it is irrelevant that not
all of the questions involved are of a federal nature: "If one
[question of Federal character] exist, if there be a single such
ingredient in the mass, it is sufficient. That element is decisive
upon the subject of jurisdiction."83 This analysis applies equally
to a person or corporation acting on federal officer's authority
or under the "color of office." There are a number of defenses
that have been found to qualify as "colorable federal defenses."
77 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1) (West 2006).
78 Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999).
79 Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 431; Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 133 (1989);
Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 397-400 (5th Cir.
1998); Magnin v. Teldyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1427-28 (11th Cir. 1996).
so Mesa, 489 U.S. at 129.
81 Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 431.
82 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods., 364 F. Supp. 2d 329, 335
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Arnold v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., 973 F. Supp.
726, 739 n.22 (S.D. Tex. 1997).




Preemption is a common defense that has been held to qual-
ify as a "colorable federal defense" under § 1442.84 Federal pre-
emption arises from the operation of the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. 5 The legislative history of the
1958 Federal Aviation Act (FA Act) ,86 which, as amended and re-
codified, remains in force today, demonstrates that federal regu-
lation of standards governing civil aviation is exclusive. The Sen-
ate Report for the Act stated this specific objective:
[A]viation is unique among transportation industries in its rela-
tion to the federal government-it is the only one whose opera-
tions are conducted almost wholly within federal jurisdiction,
and are subject to little or no regulation by States or local author-
ities. Thus, the federal government bears virtually complete re-
sponsibility for the promotion and supervision of this industry in
the public interest.87
As the head of the Airways Modernization Board stated in a
letter attached to the House Report on the Act, "It is essential
that one agency of government, and one agency alone, be re-
sponsible for issuing safety regulations if we are to have timely
and effective guidelines for safety in aviation."8 Thus, Con-
gress's consolidation of control of aviation in one agency indi-
cated its intent to federally preempt aviation safety.
In Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,8" the Supreme Court
noted that the FA Act "requires a delicate balance between
safety and efficiency,"9 and further stated, "[t]he interdepen-
dence of these factors requires a uniform and exclusive system
of federal regulation if the congressional objectives underlying
the Federal Aviation Act are to be fulfilled."
9
'
The pervasive character of the federal regulatory scheme led
the Court to conclude that there was preemption. 92 Even dis-
84 See Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 420 F.3d 852, 862 (8th Cir. 2005),
Magnin, 91 F.3d at 1429.
85 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
86 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 44101-50105 (West 2007)).
87 City of Burbank v. Lockheed, 411 U.S. 624, 644 (1973) (citing S. RP. No.
85-1811, at 5 (1958)).
88 H.R. RP. No. 85-2360 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3761.
89 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
9o Id. at 638.
91 Id. at 639.
92 Id. at 633.
2007] 499
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
senting Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Congress's intent
was sweeping: "The 1958 Act was intended to consolidate in one
agency in the Executive Branch the control over aviation ....
The paramount substantive concerns of Congress were to regu-
late federally all aspects of air safety... and, once aircraft were
in 'flight,' airspace management .... "
The pervasive control by the FAA of aviation safety, as articu-
lated in Burbank, was recognized by the Supreme Court as re-
cently as 1991. 94 Likewise, in Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,9 5 the
Fifth Circuit held that the FA Act "not only authorizes, but af-
firmatively directs the Administrator of the [FAA] to promulgate
air safety standards and regulations, including standards and
regulations relating to aircraft design, aircraft maintenance, and
inspections."96 Ultimately, the court held, "[i]n the pending
case, field preemption and conflict preemption are both appli-
cable, because there exists a comprehensive scheme of federal
regulation, and the imposition of state standards would conflict
with federal law and interfere with federal objectives. 9 7
The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal have
also held that federal regulation of the field of aviation safety in
the United States is so pervasive, and federal interests are so
dominant, that federal law occupies the field and preempts it
entirely from state regulation.98 Other courts have similarly
held that federal law preempts the field of aviation safety. 99
93 Id. at 644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
94 See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614 (1991) (holding that
the FIFRA pesticide act was not like "other implicitly pre-empted fields" such as
aviation, where the use of aviation can occur '"only by federal permission, subject
to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel, and under an
intricate system of federal commands."' (quoting Burbank, 411 U.S. at 634)).
Even earlier, the Supreme Court recognized that the federal government "has a
substantial interest in regulating aircraft travel and promoting air travel safety."
See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 23, 31 (1977).
95 366 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2004).
96 Id. at 384.
97 Id.
9 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, No. 05-15640, 2007 WL 2874401, at *1, *5-7,
*9 (9th Cir. 2007); Green v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784,
794-95 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1003 (2006); Abdullah v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
99 See e.g., Witty, 366 F.3d at 385; French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1989); Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Robinson, 486 F. Supp. 2d 713, 720 (M.D.
Tenn. 2007); Aldana v. Air E. Airways, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 489, 490 (D. Conn.
2007); Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731 (N.D. I11. 2007); Duvall v.
AVCO Corp., No. 4 CV05-1786, 2006 WL 1410794, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. May 19,
2006); Deahl v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., No. 03 C 5150, 2003 WL 22843073, at *4
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Notably, the argument that one must begin with a "presump-
tion" against preemption, thus defeating the argument for it, is
not valid in the case of aviation safety standards. The Supreme
Court has explained that "an assumption of non-pre-emption is
not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there
has been a history of significant federal presence."'' 1 ' In light of
the foregoing discussion of the pervasiveness and exclusivity of
federal regulation in this arena, it is without dispute that the
analysis of this issue can not begin with a "presumption" against
federal aviation safety preemption.'0 '
When considering the issue of removal under FORS, desig-
nees should be entitled to raise the "colorable federal defense"
of standard of care preemption, at least to the extent a plaintiffs
claims relate to or assert allegations of manufacturer wrongdo-
ing in carrying out the FAA functions delegated to it as a desig-
nee of the FAA Administrator.
b. Other Federal Defenses
i. Official Immunity
The caselaw indicates that the doctrine of official immunity
can extend to private parties.102 "The purpose of . . . official
immunity is not to protect an erring official, but to insulate the
decision-making process from the harassment of prospective liti-
gation."'0 3 Of course, official immunity is costly, because an in-
jured plaintiff, armed with a meritorious tort claim, is denied
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2003); Curtin v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 183 F. Supp. 2d 664, 671
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Schaeffer v. Cavallero, 29 F. Supp. 2d 184, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). Authors' Query: In cases such as Vivas, isn't there a clearer path to removal
under FORS for defendants such as Boeing than under federal question jurisdic-
tion? See alsoJeffreyJ. Ellis, The Third Circuit's Logical Solution to the Unnecessarily
Complex Issue of Federal Preemption of Aviation Safety, Avi. LIT. Q., Spring/Summer
2000, at 31; Thomas N. Tarnay, Comment, Aircraft Designs Subjected to FAA Special
Certification Review-Mitsuhishi MU-2 and Beechcraft Bonanza: The Role of the SCR in
Aircraft Design Certification and Implications on Federal Preemption, 62 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 591, 622 (1996). For a contrary view, see John D. McClune, There is No
Complete, Implied, or Field Federal Preemption of State Law Personal Injury/Wrongful
Death Negligence and Product Liability Claims in General Aviation Cases, 71J. AmR L. &
COM. 717, 718-31 (2006).
100 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 90 (2000) (emphasis added).
10, Id. at 99-100.
102 See Group Health Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 739 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1063-64 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., con-
curring); Blum v. Campbell, 355 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (D. Md. 1972); cf Falls
Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
103 Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988).
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relief "simply because he had the misfortune to be injured by a
federal official." 0
4
To determine if an officer is properly shielded from suit
under the circumstances, the Supreme Court uses a "functional"
inquiry: immunity attaches to particular official functions, not
to particular offices. 105 Federal official immunity extends to dis-
cretionary conduct within the scope of a defendant's official du-
ties. 10 6 This means that the conduct at issue must, first, be "the
product of independent judgment,"'1 7 and, second, "enhance
the performance of official function by advancing some legiti-
mate purpose of the office in question."'0 " Private actors partak-
ing of official immunity must meet an analogous standard. 109
Private corporate defendants may be deemed federal actors
"when they act in such a way as to create an integrated alliance
with the government and their conduct therefore is imbued
with the power and prestige of government officials.""'  For ex-
ample, national banks operating branches on federal installa-
tions have been found to be acting under the authority of the
United States and therefore entitled to removal under
§ 1442(a)(1). "'
The federal government and its agents rely on private parties
to gather information needed to execute governmental func-
tions. When private parties are required to give such informa-
tion to the government, they are also entitled to the
government's official immunity. 1 2
In the situation under discussion, a defendant may be per-
forming functions of the FAA delegated to it under a specific
statutory designation. In performing such functions, the desig-
nee will usually be exercising appropriate discretion, within the
boundaries of the regulations that the designee and the FAA are
104 Id.
105 Id. at 295 n.3.
106 Id. at 297-98.
107 Id. at 296.
108 Owens v. United States, 822 F.2d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Araujo v.
Welch, 742 F.2d 802, 805 (3d Cir. 1984).
109 See Murray v. Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc., 444 F.3d 169, 175 (2d
Cir. 2006); Bushman v. Seiler, 755 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1985); Gulati v. Zucker-
man, 723 F. Supp. 353, 358 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
110 Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
11, Texas ex rel. Falkner v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 290 F.2d 229, 231 & n.1
(5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 882 (1961).
112 Slotten v. Hoffman, 999 F.2d 333, 335 (8th Cir. 1993); Backer v. Philco
Corp., 372 F.2d 771, 773-74 (4th Cir. 1967).
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required to follow, which could provide the adequate "colorable
federal defense" to support removal under FORS.
ii. Buckman 1 3 Preemption
Plaintiffs might allege that a manufacturer essentially commit-
ted fraud on the FAA by submitting false reports in obtaining a
production certificate for an aircraft. The FAA is specifically
empowered to deal with such misconduct, both civilly and crimi-
nally." 4 Further, Congress has specifically provided a private
remedy for the FAA Administrator to reconsider the action of a
designee." 5 Additionally, the FAA has its own procedures to
deal with any fraud on the FAA. 6
The Supreme Court in Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee
expressly stated: "Policing fraud against federal agencies is
hardly 'a field which the States have traditionally occupied.' 1 1
7
Rather, "the relationship between a federal agency and the en-
tity it regulates is inherently federal in character because the re-
lationship originates from, is governed by, and terminates
according to federal law."118 Therefore, contrary to situations
involving concerns of federalism and the primary role of the
State in health and safety regulation, "no presumption against
preemption arises" when a private plaintiff alleges state law
fraud-on-the-government claims. 9
In Buckman, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiffs state
law "fraud-on-the-FDA" claims conflict with, and are therefore
impliedly preempted by, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.12
113 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
114 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 46106 (West 2004); 49 U.S.C.A. § 46301 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2007); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
115 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44702(d) (3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
116 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001, 1018 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); 14 C.F.R. § 13.5
(2007) (establishing investigative procedures); 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.101-131 (2007)
(establishing formal fact-finding investigation under an order of investigation).
117 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 348.
120 Id. at 344; accord Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. Dow Elanco, 275 F.3d 1199, 1205
(9th Cir. 2002) (stating that allowing state law fraud-on-the-EPA claims would
impede the EPA's ability to carry out its statutory objectives); Morgan v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 704, 722 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) (holding that under
Buckman, allowing a state civil law conspiracy claim would conflict with the U.S.
Department of Energy's ability to regulate and set policy consistent with its own
judgment); McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc., 21 P.3d 1189, 1199 n.9 (Cal. 2001)
("To the extent the [plaintiffs] complaint alleges fraud on the [Health Care
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Conflict between state and federal law exists due to federal statu-
tory schemes that amply empower the federal agency to punish
and deter fraud against the federal agency.12 The federal
agency uses this power to achieve a delicate balance of statutory
objectives, and allowing fraud-on-the-agency claims under state
tort law can skew this balance.122 This rationale is equally appli-
cable to the FAA.
In addition to the general criminal prohibition on making
false statements to the federal government,'2 3 the Buckman
Court held that "state law fraud-on-the-agency claims inevitably
conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud" consistent
with the judgment and goals of the Administration. 24 The Su-
preme Court held that, "as a practical matter, complying with
the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of the 50
States' tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing
potential applicants-burdens not contemplated by Congress in
enacting the [federal acts]. ' ' 125
The Buckman Court further found that fraud-on-the-FDA
claims would also cause regulated parties to fear that their dis-
closures to the FDA, although deemed appropriate by the Ad-
ministration, would later be judged insufficient in state court. 126
Therefore, those parties would then have an incentive to submit
a deluge of information that the Administration neither wants
nor needs, resulting in additional burdens on the FDA's regula-
tory efforts. 127
The FAA has the same powers as the FDA to "police fraud
consistently with the Administration's judgment and objec-
tives," 12 and to receive complaints from citizens who report
wrongdoing and petition the agency to take action.129 As a re-
sult, the rationale of Buckman applies equally well to any claim
brought against a designee of the FAA that alleges that misrep-
Financing Administration], defendants may, on remand, assert that it is pre-
empted under the rule in Buckman").
121 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 341.
122 Id. at 341, 348.
123 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
124 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 351.
127 Id.
128 Compare id. at 350, with Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Mich., 510 U.S.
355, 367 n.11 (1994).
129 Compare Buckman, 531 U.S. at 399, with Nw. Airlines, Inc., 510 U.S. at 367
n.11.
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resentation or fraud was committed in conducting the certifica-
tion activity underlying the suit.
Courts have also found Buckman applicable in instances where
a state statute immunizes a manufacturer from liability unless the
plaintiff can prove fraud on the federal agency. In Garcia v. Wy-
eth-Ayerst Laboratoiy,130 the Sixth Circuit considered a Michigan
law that immunizes a drug manufacturer unless the manufac-
turer intentionally withheld or misrepresented required infor-
mation from the FDA. 131 The Garcia court held that Buckman
prohibits a plaintiff from invoking the statutory exception on
the basis of state court findings of fraud on the FDA.132 Accord-
ingly, the Michigan law was preempted to the extent that it per-
mitted a state court to determine whether a drug manufacturer
committed fraud on the FDA.'33 However, the Garcia court con-
tinued its analysis and held that a plaintiff could utilize the statu-
tory exception only if the agency itself had determined it was
defrauded, stating:
[I]n this setting, it makes abundant sense to allow a State that
chooses to incorporate a federal standard into its law of torts to
allow that standard to apply when the federal agency itself deter-
mines that fraud marred the regulatory-approval process.' 34
Lower courts construing similar statutes have followed the
reasoning of Garcia, and have likewise held that the principles of
Buckman preclude allowing a fraud-on-the agency claim, as well
as a claim based on a state immunity statute that requires a
plaintiff to prove fraud on the agency.135 Such claims place state
courts, as fact finders, in the "uncomfortable and difficult posi-
tion of having to answer the question of what role, if any, the
allegedly withheld information would have played" in the
agency's complicated regulation and approval process.1 36 Like
the Garcia court, these courts have held that plaintiffs can only
invoke the "fraud-on-the-agency" exception to a state immunity
130 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004).
131 Id. at 963-64.
132 Id. at 966.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Kobar v. Novartis Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1173 (D. Ariz. 2005); Hen-
derson v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 04-CV-05987-LDD, 2005 WL 2600220, at *11
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2005).
136 See Kobar, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-75; Henderson, 2005 WL 2600220, at
*8-12.
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statute if the federal agency itself makes the determination that
it was defrauded. 137
In the context of removal, therefore, if a defendant who is an
FAA statutory designee is presented claims of "fraud-on-the-
FAA" by a plaintiff, the presence of the Buckman preemption
doctrine should provide a "colorable federal defense" sufficient
to support removal under FORS.
D. SCOPE OF REMOVAL
The federal court's role in a case removed under § 1442 is
"similar to that of a federal court sitting in diversity," and, "ac-
cordingly, the federal court applies the choice of law rules of the
forum state to determine the applicable law."1138 Removal juris-
diction under § 1442 is purely derivative; if the state court lacks
jurisdiction, then the federal court acquires none, even though
the federal court might have had jurisdiction over the action if it
had been first brought in the federal system. 139 Conversely, if
the state court has jurisdiction of subject matter or person, the
federal court will obtain jurisdiction upon removal. 141
The Supreme Court has reasoned that it is not of "any objec-
tion that questions are involved which are not all of Federal
character. ' 141 If one federal question exists in the case, then it is
sufficient for the case to be removed to federal court and for the
federal court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the
case. 142 Where a defendant has a right to remove under § 1442,
the entire action is entitled to removal, regardless of the rela-
tionship between the removable claim and the non-removable
claims. 143  Courts interpreting § 1442 have overwhelmingly
137 Kobar, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75; Henderson, 2005 WL 2600220, at *11.
Most recently, also following Garcia, a Texas court used the Buckman preemption
doctrine to find that a Texas government-standards presumption statute was pre-
empted. See Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., Nos. 2005-59499, 2005-58543, 2007 WL
1181991 (157th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Apr. 19, 2007). The Texas statute
found to be preempted was Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.007 (Vernon
2005 & Supp. 2006).
138 Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 941 F. Supp. 617, 620 (E.D. Tex.
1996).
139 DeRewal v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 1124, 1127-28 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
140 Id. at 1130.
141 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989).
142 Id.
143 Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Dep't of Water & Power of L. A., 496 F. Supp. 499,
509 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
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found that removal by the federal officer also operates as to
non-removing parties charged with joint negligence. 4 4
III. FEDERAL OFFICER OR AGENT AS APPLIED TO
AVIATION CASES
A. THE FAA DESIGNEE PROGRAM
Title 49 § 44702(d) of the United States Code provides that
the Administrator of the FAA may delegate to a qualified private
person, or to an employee supervised by that person, a matter
related to the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to
issue a certificate and the issuance of the certificate. 145 The
term "private person" means an individual or organization other
than a governmental authority.1 46 The "private persons" hold-
ing these designations are commonly referred to as "representa-
tives of the Administrator" and "designees."'14 7  Delegation
holders have different rights than certificate holders.14 A per-
son who holds a delegation holds it at the Administrator's dis-
cretion. 149 By comparison, once a certificate is issued under the
power of the Federal Aviation Act,' 5 1 the certificate holder has
specific appeal rights external to the Administrator, which in-
clude a right to appeal an adverse decision to the National
Transportation Safety Board.' 51 For delegation holders, the Ad-
ministrator may rescind such appointments, or choose not to
144 Jones v. Elliott, 94 F. Supp. 567, 568 (E.D. Va. 1950).
145 The constitutional basis for the statutory power to delegate is the so-called
"nondelegation doctrine." The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1. From this language, the Supreme Court derived the nondele-
gation doctrine: that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative
power to anyone else, whether another branch of government or to private per-
sons. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991). Non-legislative powers,
such as those delegated by the FAA, are not prohibited. Id.; see HaroldJ. Krent,
Fragmenting the Unitaiy Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority
Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62, 71 (1990); Editorial Board,
Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Croups, 67 HARv. L.
REv. 1398, 1398 (1954).
146 Alsup v. 3-Day Blinds, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 838, 846 (S.D. Ill. 2006). See also
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. v. Atl. Richfield, 488 F.3d 112, 124 (2d
Cir. 2007).
147 14 C.F.R. § 183.1 (2007).
148 14 C.F.R. § 183.15 (2007).
149 Lopez v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 318 F.3d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
150 49 U.S.C.A § 44702(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
151 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44702(d) (2); Lopez, 318 F.3d at 242; Steenholdt v. Fed.
Aviation Admin., 314 F.3d 633, 637-39 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Fried v. Hinson, 78 F.3d
688, 690-92 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Paster v. Toll, No. 94-55188, 1995 WL 433817, at *1
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renew them, at "any time for any reason the Administrator con-
siders appropriate.' 5 2
When performing a delegated function, designees are legally
distinct from, and act independently of, the organizations that
employ them. The maximum fees that designees may charge
for services performed under Section 44702(d) are set by the
Administrator. 153
The FAA's management and supervision of the designee system
has ensured that the system works well. Based on its decades of
experience with the system, the FAA has determined the quality
of approvals processed by these designee organizations equals
those processed by the FAA. The designee system . . .has be-
come essential to the certification system.' 54
The FAA has broad responsibility to regulate all aspects of avi-
ation; some have described FAA oversight as "cradle to the
grave" regulation. 155 Congress authorized the FAA to delegate
some of its functions to qualified private persons, including mat-
ters related to the issuance of certificates. 156 As delegation op-.
tion authorization (DOA) organizational representatives of the
Administrator, certain aircraft manufacturers 157 make the statu-
tory findings otherwise made by the FAA, including findings
(9th Cir. 1995); Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 974-75 (9th
Cir. 1994); 14 C.F.R. § 183.15(d) (2007).
152 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44702(d) (2); 14 C.F.R. § 183.15(c)(6) (2007); Lopez, 318
F.3d at 242; Steenholdt, 314 F.3d at 637-39; Fried, 78 F.3d at 692; Greenwood, 28 F.3d
at 974-75. But note that beginning in 2007, the Vision 100-Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act mandates that the FAA develop and implement a certified
design organization program, which would affect some designees currently re-
sponsible for approving the design and production of aircraft, aircraft parts, and
equipment. Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No.
108-176, 117 Stat. 2490, 2531 (2003). Under this program, certain organiza-
tional designees that design and produce aircraft parts and equipment would no
longer be designees; rather, they would conduct their approval functions under a
newly created certificate (Certified Design Organization or CDO). Id. As a certif-
icate holder, the CDOs would be subject to more formal processes when FAA
grants or revokes a certificate. FAA would develop those processes as part of its
plan to implement this program. Establishment of Organization Designation Au-
thorization Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 2970, 2973 (Jan. 21, 2004).
153 49 U.S.C.A. § 45304 (West 2004).
154 69 Fed. Reg. at 2971.
155 H.R. REP. No. 103-525(I), at 2 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1644, 1647.
156 49 U.S.C.A. § 44702(d)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
157 DOA holders presently include: The New Piper A (Vero Beach, Fla.);
Cessna DOA (Wichita, Kan.); McCauley Propeller (Wichita, Kan.); Raytheon
(Wichita, Kan.); Hartzell Propeller (Piqua, Ohio); and the Boeing Company (Se-
attle, Wash.).
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that the type design of the aircraft they produce meets all appli-
cable requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations that are
a prerequisite for the FAA to issue aircraft type and production
certificates. 5 8 The FAA has noted that when designees perform
delegated functions, they act independently of and are legally
distinct from the entities that employ them, and they act as rep-
resentatives of the FAA Administrator. 15 9 The FAA has a long
and successful history of using designees to perform delegated
functions:
Based on its decades of experience with the system, the FAA has
determined the quality of approvals processed by these designee
organizations equals those processed by the FAA. The designee
system has continually improved procedures and has become es-
sential to the certification system' 6 ° ... The FAA's designee man-
agement system is essential to the FAA's safety management
system and the certification procedures within that system. The
designee system enables the FAA to meet its safety requirements
and responsibilities and provide timely certification services. Del-
egating FAA authority to designees maximizes FAA participation
in certification projects and allows the FAA to focus on critical
safety areas.1 6 1
Regarding the FAA designee program, the FAA's oversight is de-
tailed and pervasive:
When acting as a representative of the Administrator, these per-
sons or organizations are required to perform in a manner con-
sistent with the policies, guidelines, and directives of the
Administrator. When performing a delegated function, desig-
nees are legally distinct from and act independent of the organi-
zations that employ them. The authority of these representatives
to act comes from an FAA delegation and not a certificate. As
provided by statute, the Administrator may at any time and for
any reason, suspend or revoke a delegation.' 6 2
158 See Delegation Option Authorization Procedures, 14 C.F.R. § 21.231-21.293
(2007).
159 Establishment of Organization Designation Authorization Program, 70 Fed.
Reg. 59,932, 59,933 (Oct. 13, 2005). Congress further provided that a person
affected by an action of a designee may apply to the Administrator for a review of
that action. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44702(d)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
160 Establishment of Organization Designation Authorization Procedures, 69
Fed. Reg. 2970, 2971 (Jan. 21, 2004).
161 Id. at 2972.
162 Establishment of Organization Designation Authorization Program, 70 Fed.
Reg. at 59,933.
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To illustrate, the standard Memorandum of Understanding with
DOAs, DASs, SFAR 36 operators, and ODARs (now being con-
verted to ODA holders) states that these designees "must com-
ply with the same standards, procedures, and interpretations
applicable to FAA employees accomplishing similar tasks. 163
The FAA designee statute states that "subject to regulations,
supervision and review the Administrator may prescribe, the Ad-
ministrator may delegate to a qualified private person, or to an
employee under the supervision of that person, a matter related
to the examination, testing and inspection necessary to issue an
aircraft type certificate."164 The delegations may include delega-
tions to a manufacturer and to key employees as Authorized
Representatives of the Administrator. 165
As mentioned earlier, private organizational or individual des-
ignees perform more than ninety percent of all FAA certifica-
tion activities. 166 As of May 2004, FAA designee programs
authorized approximately 13,400 private individuals and 180 or-
ganizations to act as representatives of the agency. 167 These des-
ignees are currently grouped into eighteen different programs
and are overseen by three FAA offices - Flight Standards Ser-
vice, Aerospace Medicine, and Aircraft Certification Service - all
of which are under the Office of the Associate Administrator for
Regulation and Certification.168
163 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 8100.15, ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION Au-
THORIZATION PROCEDURES app. 1, fig. 14 (2006).
164 49 U.S.C.A. § 44702(d)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
165 See Certification Procedures for Products and Parts, 14 C.F.R. §§ 21,183
(2007).
166 See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 12, at 12; see also Establish-
ment of Organization Designation Authorization Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. at
2972 (citing Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, CHALLENGE 2000: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FUTURE AVIATION SAFETY REGULATIONS (1996)).
167 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 12, at 6.
16 Those eighteen programs are: Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs); Train-
ing Center Evaluators; Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs); Aircrew Program Des-
ignees; Designated Airworthiness Representatives (DARs) (maintenance);
Designated Mechanic Examiners (DMEs); Designated Parachute Rigger Examin-
ers (DPREs); Designated Aircraft Dispatcher Examiners (DADEs); Designated
Flight Engineer Examiners (DFEEs); Computer Testing Designees; Organiza-
tional Designated Airworthiness Representatives (ODARs) (maintenance); Spe-
cial Federal Aviation Regulation No. 36 (SFAR) Repair Stations; Designated
Engineering Representatives (DERs); Designated Manufacturing Inspection Rep-
resentatives (DMIRs); Designated Airworthiness Representatives (DARs) (manu-
facturing); Organizational Designated Airworthiness Representatives (ODARs)
(manufacturing); Designated Alteration Stations (DASs); and Delegation Option
Authorizations (DOAs).
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The Supreme Court has discussed the FAA certification pro-
cess with unconditional approval:
By regulation, the Secretary has provided for the appointment of
private individuals to serve as designated engineering representa-
tives to assist in the FAA certification process. These representa-
tives are typically employees of aircraft manufacturers who
possess detailed knowledge of an aircraft's design based upon
their day-to-day involvement in its development. The representa-
tives act as surrogates of the FAA in examining, inspecting, and
testing aircraft for purposes of certification. In determining
whether an aircraft complies with FAA regulations, they are
guided by the same requirements, instructions, and procedures
as FAA employees.16
9
FORS could certainly be applied to the actions of any of the
many FAA designees. 7 0
As indicated earlier, between 2006 and 2009, the FAA will introduce a new
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program to phase out DOAs,
DASs, SFAR 36 holders, and ODARs. See Establishment of Organization Desig-
nation Authorization Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 59,932, 59,933-937 (2005) and
changes made in that rulemaking to 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.1-21.477, 121.1-121.1007,
135.1-135.507, 145.1-145.223, 183.1-183.67 (2007) and SFAR 36. In the future,
there will be six types of ODA programs, replacing the former four programs, as
follows: Type Certification ODA (TC ODA); Production Certificate ODA (PC
ODA); Supplemental Type Certification ODA (ST CODA); Technical Standard
Order Authorization Holder ODA (TSOA ODA); Major Repair, Alteration, and
Airworthiness ODA (MRA ODA); and Parts Manufacturer Approval ODA (PMA
ODA). If an organization qualifies for multiple ODA types, it will be issued one
ODA letter of designation, assigned one ODA number, and the letter of designa-
tion will list each type of ODA and detail the authorized functions for each type.
Note the common thread that runs throughout all of the eighteen, now being
transitioned to twenty, programs. In each case a designee is acting pursuant to a
federal statutory delegation (49 U.S.C.A. § 44702 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007)) and
is performing duties on behalf of, and that are otherwise required by law to be
done by, the FAA itself.
169 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 807 (1984).
170 The enabling statutes provide that the Administrator's delegations are "sub-
ject to regulations, supervision, and review" that she prescribes. 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 44701 (a) (2) (c), 44702(d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). In the case of desig-
nees, this supervision and oversight include the following regulations and poli-
cies: for DERs, Designated Engineering Representatives-14 C.F.R. § 183.29
(2007); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 8100.8 (2007); for DARs, Designated Air-
worthiness Representatives-14 C.F.R. § 183.33 (2007); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OR-
DER 8130.33, DESIGNATED AIRWORTHINESS REPRESENTATIVES: AMATEUR-BUILT AND
LIGHT-SPORT AIRCRAFr CERTIFICATION FUNCTIONS (2004); for DMIRs, Designated
Manufacturing Inspection Representatives-17 C.F.R. § 183.31 (2007); FED. AVIA-
TION ADMIN., ORDER 8100.8C, DESIGNEE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (2007); for Des-
ignated Manufacturing Inspection Representatives, DMEs, Technical Personnel
Examiners-14 C.F.R. § 183.25 (2007); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 8610.4K,
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Consider the variety and multiplicity of functions FAA desig-
nees perform on behalf of the Administrator:
* Airman physicals (AMEs).
* Airman Training and Qualifications (Training Center Evalu-
ators; DPEs; Aircrew Program Designees; DMEs; DPREs; DADEs;
DFEEs; and Computer Testing Designees).
* Aircraft Maintenance, Repair, and Alteration (DARs (mainte-
nance); ODARs (maintenance); SFAR 36 Repair Stations; and
DASs).
* Aircraft Engineering and Manufacturing (DERs; DMIRs;
DARs (manufacturing); ODARS (manufacturing); and DOAs).
Note that most organizational designees perform similar activ-
ities as individual designees, but the organization holds the des-
ignation rather than the employees who work for the
organization. Such employees, who actually perform the dele-
gated activities, are referred to as "authorized representa-
tives." '17 1
It is not surprising that, given the fact that more than ninety
percent of the FAA's certification functions are performed by
designees, there is a "rich" source of removal jurisdiction when
their performance is questioned in lawsuits.
B. DESIGNEE CASES INVOLVING § 1442 REMOVAL
There are relatively few aviation cases involving removal
under § 1442. Research indicates that the issue of federal of-
ficer removal in the context of FAA-delegated authority has
been raised in only five cases: one published opinion and four
unpublished opinions.
AVIATION MECHANIC EXAMINER HANDBOOK (2006); for DPREs, Technical Person-
nel Examiners-14 C.F.R. § 183.25 (2007); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 8610.5K,
PARACHUTE RIGGER EXAMINER HANDBOOK (2006); for DPEs, Pilot Examiners-14
C.F.R. § 183.23 (2007); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 8710.3E, DESIGNATED PILOT
AND FLIGHT ENGINEER EXAMINER'S HANDBOOK (2006); for DASs, Designated Alter-
ation Station Authorization Procedures-14 C.F.R. §§ 21.431-21.453 (2007); for
DOAs, Delegation Option Authorization Procedures-14 C.F.R. §§ 21.231-21.273
(2007); for SFAR 36 repair stations, see FED. AVtATION ADMIN., ORDER 8100.9A,
DAS, DOA, AND SFAR AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES (2005); SFAR 36-see FED.
AVIATION ADMIN., SPECIAL FED. REGULATION No. 36,417 (2006). In addition, a
Procedure Manual is required for DASs, DOAs and SFAR 36 repair stations:
Cessna's Manual runs over 250 pages. For the 4,000 plus AMEs, they are re-
quired to also comply with the FAA's Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners, also
over 250 pages in length.




First, in the case of In re Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liti-
gation,172 Cessna removed a case under FORS. 173 In that case,
the removal, which was affirmed by the assigned MDL district
court, was predicated upon the FAA's DOA delegation issued to
Cessna and the nexus shown between plaintiffs' amended com-
plaints and Cessna's examination and testing of the 208 Caravan
for type certification by the FAA. 1
74
In Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors,1 75 the only case de-
cided on this issue by a circuit court, the pilot of a private plane
was killed in a crash. 176 The plaintiff sued the engine manufac-
turer and, individually, the designated manufacturing inspec-
tion representative (DMIR), alleging that he proximately caused
the fatal crash by executing an "Export Certificate of Airworthi-
ness" following an inadequate inspection, certifying the engine
as airworthy when it was, in fact, defective. 17 7 In denying plain-
tiff's motion to remand, the court held that "at least part of [the
DMIR's] defense is that he acted within the scope of his federal
duties, that what he did was required of him by federal law, and
that he did all federal law required. That defense raises a fed-
eral question, which justifies removal."' 178
The importance of meeting the "nexus" requirement under
FORS is reflected in Britton v. Rolls Royce Engine Services.17' The
court remanded Britton, distinguishing Magnin by finding that
the plaintiffs' complaint did not name any individual defendant
authorized by the FAA as a designee, did not identify the defen-
dant arguing against remand, Dallas Airmotive, Inc. (DAI), as an
FAA DMIR, and did not expressly allege that DAI's issuance of
an airworthiness certificate as a DMIR had anything to do with
the accident.1 0
172 No. 05-md-1721-KHV (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2007).
173 See id. (order denying Plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court)
(relating only to Fry v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 06-CV-2261-KHV); see also Vande-
venter v. Guimond, 494 F.Supp. 2d 1255, 1265-67 (D. Kan. 2007) (affirming the
difference between FAA "designees" and certificated airmen).
174 Id. at 1.
175 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1996).
176 Id. at 1426-27.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1428. For a further discussion of Magnin and recent trends in re-
moval jurisdiction in the Eleventh Circuit, see Jay P. Lechner, Recent Trends in the
Eleventh Circuit: Removal Jurisdiction and Procedures in Employment Law Litigation, 28
NOVA L. REv. 351, 378 (2004).
179 Britton v. Rolls Royce Engine Servs., No. C 05-01057 SI, 2005 WL 1562855,
at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2006).
180 Id.
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Similarly, another district court distinguished Magnin and re-
manded a suit in the Southern District of Florida.",' In Cesefia v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., the district court held that no
federal issue existed despite the argument by McDonnell Doug-
las that one of its employees functioned as an FAA DER.18 2 The
case involved the crash of an MD600 television news helicopter
in Miami, and McDonnell Douglas cited Magnin, arguing that
the federal officer removal statute applied because of its em-
ployee's status as a DER.18 3 The court disagreed, noting that
Magnin involved a designee who was named as a party to the
lawsuit and, more importantly, had signed an airworthiness cer-
tificate shortly before the crash, which the plaintiffs in Magnin
alleged negligently contributed to the accident.1 84 In contrast,
the Cesefia court noted that the DER was not named and there
was no allegation of negligent inspection or certification of the
MD600 helicopter, stating:
The manufacture, design and assembly of the helicopter involve
Bregger [the DER], if at all, as an MDHC employee wearing his
MDHC hat, not his FAA hat. Unlike Magnin, the claim against
MDHC exists even if Bregger and MDHC fully complied with all
FAA regulations .... The mere fact that during a pre-certifica-
tion test flight the MD600's rotors experienced contact with the
tail boom will not provide a valid causal nexus to support
removal. 8 15
Although McDonnell Douglas' DER acted within the scope of
his FAA responsibilities when he certified the rotor/tailboom
clearance on the MD600, the suit was not one meeting the
"nexus" requirement between the certification of the design and
the activity alleged by the plaintiff to have resulted in the
accident.186
On the other hand, in AIG Europe (UK) Ltd. v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., the court, following Magnin, found that McDonnell
Douglas used some of its employees as FAA designees (DERs) to
certify the MD-1 1, and that there was a causal nexus between the
alleged negligent certification and the accident, when plaintiffs
181 Cesefia v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., No. 00-3161- CIV, at 2-3
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2000) (order granting Plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to
state court).
182 Id. at 3.
183 Id. at 1-2.
184 Id. at 2-3.
185 Id. at 3.
186 Id. at 3.
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alleged that the manufacturer failed to comply with the proper
process for certifying the airplane.18 7
According to each of these five cases, tojustify removal under
FORS, the overriding lesson is that there must be a causal link
between the plaintiffs' claims of negligence and the conduct of
some FAA appointee or designee acting in that capacity. The
FAA has described the designation as an "appointment," and
the designee as a "representative. '"1 8 Courts have called the
FAA designee a "surrogate" of the Administrator,' 89 and one
Oklahoma court characterized the designee as having been
"deputized by [the FAA] to perform official acts."'19° In any case,
however, the result is the same: the designee is "acting under"
the FAA and when its conduct in doing so is implicated [i.e.,
alleged to have a causal nexus] in a state action, either civil or
criminal, that action may be removed under FORS to a federal
tribunal.
C. OTHER PROGRAMS ANALOGOUS TO THE FAA
DESIGNEE SYSTEM
Transport Canada oversees a system of designees (which are
called "delegates") that is substantially smaller than the FAA's
and focuses primarily on aircraft design and design
modifications.19 '
In the United States, other federal agencies charge user fees
to process applications for approvals or licenses.
For instance, the Federal Drug Administration charges pharma-
ceutical companies application fees to recover the cost of the
187 AIG Europe (UK) Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. CV 02-8703-GAF,
2003 WL 257702, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2003).
188 Fed. Aviation Admin., Application, Selection & Appointment Process,
http://www.faa.gov/other.visit/aviation industry/designees-delegations/asa/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
189 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerca Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 807 (1984).
190 See Brown v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ-03-8 I 1-L, 2004 WL 5041257, at *5
(W.D. Okla. Oct. 8, 2004) ("Nor is this a case where defendants were deputized
by a federal agency to perform official acts, such as in Magnin v. Teledyne Continen-
tal Motors.").
191 Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 12, at 37. Established in the
1980s, Canada's two types of organizational delegates, Design Approval Organiza-
tions and Airworthiness Engineering Organizations, are authorized to evaluate
and approve technical data to determine compliance with safety requirements.
Id.
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agency's review of new drugs. 192 As another example, U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection charges fees to brokers-private in-
dividuals and companies that are licensed and regulated by the
agency to aid importers and exporters in moving merchandise
through Customs. 9 '
But as far as can be determined, no other federal agency, pursu-
ant to congressional authorization, delegates more than ninety
percent of its statutory certification activities to private parties as
does the FAA.' 94
IV. A "FLIGHT PLAN" TO REMOVAL
A. JOINDER
Removals under § 1442 are an exception to the general re-
moval rule that would require all defendants to join in the re-
moval petition.195 Congressional policy that allows removal by a
federal officer could easily be hindered by joining non-federal
defendants unwilling to remove if their consent were
required.' 96
B. TIMELINESS
If a defendant proceeds to defend the action in state court, he
may waive his right to remove to federal court.197 The waiver
must be clear and indicate a specific, positive intent to proceed
in state court. 9 ' Two factors guide the court in determining
when there is clear intent and hence when the right to remove
has been waived. 19 9 First, the court must analyze the purpose of
the defendant's actions to determine whether they were merely
attempting to preserve the status quo or whether they were in-
tending to litigate the merits of the case. z°° Second, the court
must determine if removal is simply a disguise for the defendant
192 The user fee program was established by the Prescription Drug User Fee
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified as amended in 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 379g-379h (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)).
193 See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 12 at 39.
194 Id. at 3.
195 Id.
196 Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 1998).
197 Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986).
198 Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 1989); Gore v. Stenson, 616 F.
Supp. 895, 898 (S.D. Tex. 1984).




to appeal an adverse ruling in state court. 20 "The right of re-
moval is not lost by action in the state court short of proceeding
to an adjudication on the merits. 20 2
Title 28 § 1446(b) of the United States Code provides an ex-
ception to the rule that a notice of removal must be filed within
thirty days after receipt of a copy of the initial pleading.20 3 The
exception applies if the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable, but the defendant subsequently receives an
amended pleading, motion, order, or "other paper" in which it
may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has be-
come removable. 2 4 The notice of removal must be filed within
thirty days after receipt of the amended pleading, motion, or-
der, or "other paper. ' 20 5 This exception serves the dual pur-
poses of preventing defendants from having to speculate
whether a case is removable, and to deter plaintiffs from seeking
to disguise the true federal character of a claim.20 6
Where the plaintiff's pleadings are subject to two reasonable
interpretations, one of which would make the case removable
and one of which would not, the pleading is ambiguous and the
defendant is not required to guess with respect to removabil-
ity.2 ° 7 As a result, the thirty-day requirement is tolled.20 8 Courts
have held that a defendant need not remove until it is "unequiv-
ocally apparent that the case [is] removable." 09
The Ninth Circuit has held that timeliness of the removal is to
be given the same liberal interpretation as the removal statute
itself 210 "As far as the federal officer is concerned, the case isn't
,removable' until the federal officer ground for removal is
disclosed."2''
201 Id.; Jacko v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
202 Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2003); Beighley,
868 F.2d at 782; Ortiz v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 257 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889
(S.D. Tex. 2003).
20-3 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Akin v. Big Three Indus. Inc., 851 F. Supp. 819 824 (E.D. Tex. 1994); see also
Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 1993).
207 Akin, 851 F. Supp. at 825.
208 Id.
2019 Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir. 1998).
210 Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2006).
211 Id.; see also Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969).
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C. PROOF
The defendant's removal papers must show that the defen-
dant was an officer of the United States or an agency thereof, or
a person acting under such an officer, and that the defendant
was "acting under color of such office when he did the act for
which he is being sued. '212 In addition, the defendant removing
the case under § 1442 need not show that he is threatened with
personal liability where the allegations involve aspects of imple-
mentation of an official program and challenged actions were
taken under color of office.213
The Supreme Court has noted that in a criminal case, "a more
detailed showing might be necessary because of the more com-
pelling state interest in conducting criminal trials in the state
courts. ' 214 The Court later quoted its language in Imbler v.
Pachtman21 5 that it "has never suggested that the policy consider-
ations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental of-
ficials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law. 216
D. JUDIcIAL REVIEW
In general, an order remanding a removed case back to the
state court from which it was removed cannot be reviewed on
appeal.21 7 Unless the denial of the motion to remand falls
within one of the few situations in which an interlocutory appeal
is allowable, a court's decision to deny a party's motion to re-
mand and instead retain jurisdiction of the case is not subject to
interlocutory review.21 8
The "substantive decision exception" is an exception to the gen-
eral rule that remand orders are not subject to appellate review.
The exception distinguishes between jurisdictional and substan-
tive aspects of the remand order: The exception applies only if
the remand order is based on a substantive decision on the mer-
212 Swan v. Cmty. Relations-Soc. Dev. Comm'n, 374 F. Supp. 9, 11 (E.D. Wis.
1974).
213 See Nat'l Ctr. for Hous. Mgm't v. Hous. Auth. of Milwaukee, 668 F. Supp.
1230, 1231-32 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
214 See Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409 n.4.
215 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
216 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 133 (1989) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at
429).
217 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); see also Powerex Corp v.
Reliant Energy Servs. Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2007).
218 Neal v. Brown, 980 F.2d 747, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also 16 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.44[1] [a] (3d ed. 2006).
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its of a collateral issue, rather than on subject matter
jurisdiction.2 1 9
Thus, the remand is reviewable if a federal district court remands
after making a substantive decision on the merits of an issue,
other than subject matter jurisdiction, provided that the court
had jurisdiction to examine the merits of that issue, and the sub-
stantive decision is conclusive on that issue. 220
V. WATSON-A RECENT DEVELOPMENT MAY CLARIFY
THE LAW
Significantly, the newest and most definitive interpretation of
FORS comes from the United States Supreme Court. On Janu-
ary 12, 2007, the Court granted two petitions for writs of certio-
rari in Watson v. Philip Morris2 21 to address the question of
"[w] hether a private party doing no more than complying with
federal regulation" is entitled to remove a civil action brought in
state court under state law to federal court under FORS.2 2 2 In
Watson, the Eighth Circuit accepted a certification for interlocu-
tory review from a district court in Arkansas and held that the
FTC had exercised comprehensive control over Philip Morris'
advertising of light cigarettes and in doing so, Philip Morris was
"acting under" officials of the FTC; accordingly, the case, origi-
nally filed in state court, was properly removed to federal court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1442.223
While the facts in this tobacco case occurred in a context
other than aviation, two aspects of Watson will be very important
for aviation practitioners:
219 Niehaus v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 173 F.3d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1999);
City of Waco v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 142-44 (1934); 16
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.44[2] [a] (3d ed.
2006).
220 See Niehaus, 173 F.3d at 1211; United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. at 144;
16JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.44[2] [a] [ii] (3d
ed. 2006).
221 Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 127 S. Ct. 1055 (2007); Watson v. Philip Mor-
ris Cos., 126 S. Ct. 2315 (2006).
222 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *I,
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 05-1284 (Feb. 26, 2007), 2007 WL 621847.
223 420 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2005). Every other circuit that has addressed this
question has found that tobacco companies do not "act under" the FFC. See
Paldemic v. Altria Corp. Servs., 327 F. Supp. 2d 959, 965-68 (E.D. Wis. 2004);
Virden v. Altria Group, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 832, 844-47 (N.D. W. Va. 2004);
Tremblay v. Philip Morris, 231 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416-19 (D.N.H. 2002).
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1. The Eight Circuit found federal preemption to be a "colora-
ble" defense for purposes of Section 1442;224 and
2. The Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in using a "com-
prehensive control" test for determining when a defendant is
"acting under" a federal official for removal purposes.225
Of special interest, the Office of the Solicitor General (SG)
filed its Brief as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioners on
February 26, 2007.226 Petitioners and the SG contend that a per-
son is "acting under" a federal officer only when that person
assists or acts on behalf of a federal officer in the performance
of the officer's official duties.2 7 Respondents contend that a
person is also "acting under" a federal officer when that person
is subject to the federal officer's direction and control. 228
In the SG's brief, the Magnin case, involving an FAA DMIR, is
given as an example of the proper application of this statue.229
But more importantly, the SG affirms the premise of this Article,
that carrying out an official government function is a sufficient
basis for removal. 230 This statement fits perfectly in the FAA
context of statutory delegations to private persons. While there
is also comprehensive "control" in the sense of detailed aviation
safety regulations, the overarching principle, at least for pur-
poses of federal officer removal, is that Congress authorized the
Administrator to delegate official FAA functions to private per-
sons, and therefore they are, almost as a matter of law, "acting
under" the Administrator. Or as the Supreme Court itself said,
they are "surrogates" of the FAA.231
The SG's amicus brief in Watson, and a review of the cases and
materials cited, is an excellent place to begin when considering
this removal scenario.
224 Watson, 420 F.3d at 862-63.
225 Id. at 862.
226 See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 05-1284 (Feb. 26, 2007), 2007 WL
621847.
227 See Brief for Petitioners at *9, Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 05-1284
(Feb. 23, 2007), 2007 WIL 579304; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at *7, Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 05-1284 (Feb. 26,
2007), 2007 WL 621847.
228 See Brief of Respondents at *17, Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 05-1284
(Mar. 30, 2007), 2007 WL 966518.
229 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *26,
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 05-1284 (Feb. 26, 2007), 2007 WL 621847.
230 Id. at *17-*19.
231 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 807 (1984).
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The SG argues, in pertinent part, as follows: 232
A. "The Text, Evolution, And Judicial Construction Of The
Federal Officer Removal Statute Make Clear That It Permits Re-
moval By Private Parties Only When They Act On Behalf Of Or
Otherwise Assist Federal Officers In Carrying Out Their Official
Duties";
23
B. "Limiting Private-Party Removal To Persons Assisting Federal
Officers In The Performance Of Official Duties Accords With
The Purpose Of The Federal Officer Removal Statute";23 4
C. "Permitting Removal By Private Parties Subjected To De-
tailed And Specific Federal Regulation Would Potentially Shift
Into Federal Court A Wide Range Of Traditional State Law
Claims";
23 5
D. "A Proper Understanding Of The Scope Of The Federal Of-
ficer Removal Statute Leaves Ample Room For Removal By Pri-
vate Parties In Appropriate Cases. '23 6
It is at this juncture in the brief that the SG points to cases
exhibiting a proper understanding of the scope of the statute
and cites the following FAA case as an example:
[A] private citizen delegated authority to inspect aircraft by the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acts
under a federal officer in conducting such an inspection and is-
suing a certificate of airworthiness. Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Mo-
tors.2 37 That is true regardless of whether the private individual is
viewed as performing a law enforcement role or a safety protec-
tion role. The critical point is that the individual acts on behalf of the
FAA Administrator in conducting the inspection.23 8
232 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
*11, *17, *19, *24, Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 05-1284 (Feb. 26, 2007),
2007 WL 621847.
233 Id. at *11 (citing Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, at 405-06 (1969);
City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 814-15 (1966); Maryland v. Soper,
270 U.S. 9, 30-31, 35 (1925); Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 600 (1883)).
234 Id. at *17 (citing Wilingham, 395 U.S. at 406; Davis, 107 U.S. at 263).
235 Id. at *19 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc., 545 U.S. 308, 319
(2005); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826,
830-32 (2002); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817
(1986); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936)).
236 Id. at *24 (citing Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1428
(11th Cir. 1996)).
237 Note that a DOA inspects and issues a certificate of airworthiness, much
like the DMIR in that case. Neither issue a type certificate, as explained earlier.
238 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *26,
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 05-1284 (Feb. 26, 2007), 2007 WL 621847 (em-
phasis added).
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In contrast to the Magnin case, the SG argues that the Circuit
Court decision in Watson reflects a misapplication of the federal
officer removal statute:
Section 1442(a) (1) does not remotely encompass tobacco manu-
facturers that market their cigarettes as "light," because in so do-
ing the tobacco companies are not acting on behalf of federal
officers or otherwise assisting federal officers in carrying out
their duties. Respondent hardly markets "light" cigarettes on the
FTC's behalf; it does so solely in furtherance of its own economic
interest .... Mere compliance with federal law does not trans-
form a private party that is acting solely to further its own eco-
nomic interests into a party that is acting on behalf of or
otherwise assisting federal officers in carrying out their duties.239
Watson was argued before the Supreme Court on April 25,
2007. The transcript of the oral argument points up the follow-
ing significant exchanges between the Assistant Solicitor Gen-
eral for the United States and Chief Justice Roberts, as it relates
to the status of FAA representatives under FORS:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about ... what about USDA
food inspection? Isn't a lot of that delegated to the producers
rather than the Government officials?
Mr. GORNSTEIN: The Government...
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But you still get a Government
stamp.
MR. GORNSTEIN: You can have different situations. And I'm
not sure about the precise one you're talking about. But you can
have situations and the FAA is one, where the FAA has a statute
which says you can delegate to third parties inspecting aircrafts,
and the Agency certifies through regulation that this person is
inspecting as a representative of the FAA. Now that's a varied
situation. In that kind of situation the person would [be] acting
under. But if the person is simply complying with Federal re-
quirements about how to test, that is private behavior, acting on
their own behalf, in order to further the marketing of their
products.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So if you are a federally certified
inspector you are acting under...
MR. GORNSTEIN: Certified as a representative of the FAA, yes,
you are.
240
239 Id. at 26-27.
240 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 127
S. Ct. 2301 (2007) (No. 05-1284), available at www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-ar-
guments/argumenttranscripts/ 0 5-1284.pdf.
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Notice how the SG (who cited the Magnin case) carefully
guides the Chief Justice towards the proper characterization of
the FAA function that qualifies for "acting under," i.e., it is not
that the designee is a "federally certified inspector" but that he
is "certified as a representative of the FAA. ' 241  There are hun-
dreds of thousands of certified airmen who perform pre-flight
inspections of aircraft but only some 13,000-plus "representa-
tives" of the FAA that are, in the words of the Court, "surro-
gates" of the FAA Administrator.242
VI. CONCLUSION
This discussion has attempted to identify the unique aspects
of FORS and distinguish it from other avenues of removal juris-
diction. FORS should not be confused or merged with federal
question, diversity, or "arising under" jurisdictional issues;
rather, FORS stands alone. The following distinctions, there-
fore, are important in properly identifying a case for removal
under FORS, as contrasted with one that only implicates other
jurisdictional grounds.
" A defense that only raises a federal question is inadequate to
confer federal jurisdiction. 243
* A claim "arising under" Article III of the Constitution confers
federal jurisdiction but must be determined by reference to
the "well-pleaded complaint.., unaided by anything alleged
in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought
the defendant may interpose."244
* "Arising under" jurisdiction, a less frequently discussed but
historic variety of federal jurisdiction, exists when state law
claims "necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually dis-
puted and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of
federal and state responsibilities. 245
" Since Grable, the Supreme Court has characterized "arising
under" jurisdiction as a "special and small category."2 46
241 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 240, at 22 (emphasis added).
242 See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Granderise (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 807 (1984).
243 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
244 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust Fund for S. Cal., 463
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983).
245 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Danue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312,
314, 310-15 (2005).
246 Empire Healthchoice Assoc., Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2136 (2006).
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* In summary, while § 1441(a) permits removing a case from
state to federal court if the action could have been filed origi-
nally in federal court, where the removal is not based on di-
versity of citizenship, § 1441(b) is used to remove "arising
under" jurisdiction cases. The latter are predicated on the
"well-pleaded complaint" doctrine. On the other hand, the
Federal Officer Removal Statute (FORS) is a "pure jurisdic-
tional statute" that does nothing more than grant federal dis-
trict court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal officer is a
defendant and "cannot independently support Article III
'arising under' jurisdiction." Rather, "it is the raising of a fed-
eral question in the officer's removal petition that constitutes
the federal law under which the action against the federal of-
ficer [or agent] 'arises' for Art. III purposes. '"247
* Thus, § 1442 brings the entire case to the federal court; it
does not require the consent of the other defendants, as in
diversity cases. It applies to both civil actions and criminal
prosecutions. Its primary purpose is to allow the validity of
the federal officer's (or agent's) defense to be adjudicated in
a federal forum. It is given a liberal application. It is not re-
quired that the removing defendant win his case before he
can have it removed. It does not require the resolution, or
even a detailed inquiry into, the merits of the federal defense
advanced; rather, the federal defense alleged need only be
plausible and its ultimate validity is not to be determined at
the time of removal. The "well-pleaded complaint" rule does
not apply, and the removal right is "absolute."
An illustration of a "conflation" of these principles is a recent
decision by a federal district court on motions for remand in
multiple actions filed as a result of the Comair jet crash at Lex-
ington, Kentucky that resulted in forty-nine fatalities. 24 8 There,
the court considered whether there was only a "preemption" de-
fense that, short of complete preemption, required remand;
whether the court had original federal question jurisdiction to
support removal; or whether, in fact, there was "arising under"
247 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).
248 See In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 486 F. Supp. 2d 640,
642-43 (E.D. Ky. 2007). See also Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 908
(7th Cir. 2007). Compare the possible result in both of these cases if there had
been "minimal diversity" jurisdiction and at least seventy-five fatalities and the
cases were removed under the new Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2007) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1369, 1391, 1441, 1697, and 1785 (West 2006)). SeeAngelaJ. Rafoth, Congress
and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002: Meaningful Reform or a
Comedy of Errors, 54 DuwE LJ. 255, 258-91 (2004).
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jurisdiction that required the resolution of a "substantial federal
question" like that in Grable.249 Finding none of these bases, the
motions to remand were granted.2 5' But consider, if all three
elements of FORS's independent right of removal had been pre-
sent, as in the case of an FAA designee being sued whose acts
complained of were performed in his capacity as a designee,
that the court may have been justified in denying remand.
The question presented in Watson2 5 is necessarily narrow, but
the Court's decision this term could settle some of the variances
among the circuits in the construction of this important statute
thereby establishing a clear path to removal for those persons
who are delegated or appointed as designees to perform official
functions on behalf of the FAA Administrator under the Federal
Aviation Act.
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AME Aviation Medical Examiner
CDO Certified Design Organization
DADE Designated Aircraft Dispatcher Examiner
DAR Designated Airworthiness Representative
DAS Designated Alteration Station
DER Designated Engineering Representative
DFEE Designated Flight Engineer Examiner
DME Designated Mechanic Examiner
DMIR Designated Manufacturing Inspection Representative
DOA Delegation Option Authorization
DPE Designation Pilot Examiner
DPRE Designated Parachute Rigger Examiner
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
FORS Federal Officer Removal Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442)
FTC Federal Trade Commission
249 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 646-48.
250 Id.
251 For a further analysis of Watson to the oral argument stage, see Cornell
University Law School, Legal Information Institute Bulletin: Watson v. Philip
Morris Companies, Inc. (05-1284), http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-
1284.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
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